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“ONE COUNTRY TWO SYSTEMS” AS 
BEDROCK OF HONG KONG’S CONTINUED 
SUCCESS: FICTION OR REALITY? 
HORACE YEUNG* 
FLORA HUANG** 
Abstract: Despite the handover of sovereignty over Hong Kong from the Unit-
ed Kingdom to China in 1997, the principles of “one country two systems” reaf-
firmed the autonomy of Hong Kong in a number of respects. In accordance with 
the Sino-British Joint Declaration and Basic Law of Hong Kong, the city is able 
to enjoy a high degree of autonomy over the systems and policies practiced lo-
cally, including social and economic systems, as well as the executive, legisla-
tive and judicial systems. Additionally, with its image as a robust financial mar-
ket largely thanks to the institutions inherited from its colonial era, Hong Kong 
is able to attract a number of financial activities from China and has firmly es-
tablished itself as a leading international financial center. Nonetheless, there 
have been concerns that the advantages of Hong Kong started to fade after its 
reunification with China. This Article seeks to analyze how Hong Kong’s capi-
talist system shields the city from the socialist system of China under the princi-
ples of “one country two systems,” allowing the city to maintain its position as a 
premier financial center. It explores the regulatory gap between Hong Kong and 
China, illustrating that Hong Kong’s strength stems from the operation of a 
strong company and financial law regime independent of the legal regime in 
China. 
INTRODUCTION 
“Hong Kong will be administered by people in Hong Kong. The adminis-
trators will be elected by the people there.” 1  
—Deng Xiaoping 
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The relationship between Hong Kong and China is unique in having the 
“one country two systems” principles, widely understood to be pioneered by 
Deng Xiaoping, the paramount leader of China and architect of Gaige 
Kaifang. This twin-strategy of reform and opening up ensured the present 
economic success of China. The “one country two systems” principles were 
subsequently transposed into the Sino-British Joint Declaration and Basic 
Law of Hong Kong which entailed the following key promises: first, the 
Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (SAR) government shall be com-
posed of local inhabitants; second, the legislature, to whom the executive au-
thorities shall be accountable, shall be constituted by elections; third, judicial 
power, which shall be exercised independently, shall be vested in the SAR 
courts and these courts shall possess the power of final adjudication; fourth, 
the rights and freedoms of inhabitants shall be protected such that every per-
son shall have the right to freedom of speech, of the press, of assembly, and 
of religious belief, as well as the right to judicial remedies, the right to confi-
dential legal advice, and the right to challenge in court the actions of the ex-
ecutive branch of government; and lastly, the social and economic systems in 
Hong Kong and the lifestyle of inhabitants shall remain unchanged for at least 
fifty years.2  
This Article contends that Hong Kong’s status as a quasi-state has been 
the cornerstone of its success. The investigation will be divided into six parts. 
The next part will give an overview of Hong Kong’s history and how it rose 
to prominence as Asia’s leading financial center. Part II will explain how the 
“one country two systems” principles should be understood in the context of 
this paper. Parts III and IV will compare the general evolution and specific 
aspects of the corporate and financial law regimes of Hong Kong and China 
to reveal a potential regulatory gap between the two jurisdictions. Part V ex-
amines the recent political tension in Hong Kong between pro-democracy and 
pro-Beijing groups, discussing whether a divided Hong Kong, will affect the 
continued success of the city due to constitutional uncertainty. The final part 
will conclude that Hong Kong’s strength has come from the operation of a 
strong company and financial law regime independent of the legal regime on 
mainland China. 
I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF HONG KONG & ITS SUCCESS 
A. Humble Beginnings & Breakthrough 
On December 19, 1984, British and Chinese officials released a Joint 
Declaration stating that Hong Kong would become the Hong Kong Special 
                                                                                                                           
 2  See John Head, Selling Hong Kong to China: What Happened to the Right of Self-
Determination?, 46 U. KAN. L. REV. 283, 294 (1998). 
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Administrative Region (SAR) of the People’s Republic of China on July 1, 
1997.3 Today, Hong Kong is one of the most affluent areas in the region, with 
a gross domestic product (GDP) per capita of $52,700 in 2013, the fifteenth 
highest in the world.4 The rise of Hong Kong to its present status is a miracle 
because when it was colonized by the British Empire in 1842, it was merely a 
small fishing village.  
Despite these humble beginnings, Hong Kong developed a strong foun-
dation in financial instruments issuance and dealing “within the British sys-
tem, particularly company and contractual law and financial practices.” 5 
Trading in Hong Kong in company shares can be traced back to about 1860.6 
Indeed, one of the largest banks in the world, HSBC, first opened its doors for 
business in Hong Kong in March 1865 aiming to finance the growing trade 
between Europe, India, and China.7 In 1891, the Association of Stockbrokers 
in Hong Kong was formed, marking more than one hundred years of devel-
opment for its stock exchange.8 
Since the 1980s, Hong Kong’s economy has become increasingly ser-
vice-oriented. Nowadays, the service industry accounts for more than 90 per-
cent of Hong Kong’s GDP.9 Before the growth of its financial services sector, 
international trade had long been a defining characteristic of the Hong Kong 
economy. Beginning in the 1950s, exports of domestically produced light 
industrial products served as the engine of growth for nearly three decades.10 
Since the late 1970s, many Hong Kong manufacturers have relocated their 
labor-intensive production processes to China to take advantage of the low 
production costs available there. 11  GDP contribution from manufacturing 
shrank from 13 percent in 1992, to 4 percent in 2002, and then plummeted to 
                                                                                                                           
 3 See id. 
 4The World Factbook: Hong Kong, CIA, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-fact
book/geos/hk.html, archived at https://perma.cc/7T35-ZXE9. For comparison, the GDP per capita of 
the United States was $52,800 in the same year. The World Factbook: United States, CIA, https://
www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/us.html, archived at https://perma.cc/56E3-
N4KR. 
 5 SEC. & FUTURES COMMISSION, SECURITIES REGULATION IN HONG KONG 3 (2002), availa-
ble at https://www.sfc.hk/web/doc/EN/speeches/public/others/speechbook/fullversion.pdf, archived 
at https://perma.cc/9FL8-XYBK. 
 6 See id. 
 7 See HSBC’s History, HSBC, http://www.hsbc.com/about-hsbc/company-history/hsbc-history 
(last visited Mar. 31, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/2MNC-8HVR. 
 8 SEC. & FUTURES COMMISSION, supra note 5, at 3–4.  
 9 See H.K. INFO. SERV. DEP’T, GOVERNMENT YEARBOOK 2013, at 37 (2014), available at 
http://www.yearbook.gov.hk/2013/en/pdf/E03.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/WJH8-8VCM. 
 10 Hong Kong as a Trading Hub: Entrepôt and Beyond, H.K. TRADE & DEV. COUNCIL (Apr. 1, 
2007), http://economists-pick-research.hktdc.com/business-news/article/Economic-Forum/Hong-Kong-
as-a-Trading-Hub-Entrep-ocirc-t-and-Beyond/ef/en/1/1X000000/1X0034J5.htm, archived at http://
perma.cc/6ZMK-PWJC. 
 11 Id. 
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less than 2 percent in 2012.12 As the foregoing statistics show, Hong Kong 
has transformed from a sleepy fishing village into a vibrant service-oriented 
economy. 
The breakthrough for Hong Kong’s stock market was the opening of the 
Far East Stock Exchange on December 17, 1969. 13  In the 1970s, Hong 
Kong’s securities market became firmly established and then flourished.14 By 
early 1973, the Hang Seng Index, which is the free float-adjusted market 
capitalization-weighted stock market index in Hong Kong, reached a record 
high of 1,775 points, which has since been eclipsed many times.15 The subse-
quent collapse of this speculative boom in 1974 led the government to regu-
late the rapidly expanding market to meet investor protection and financial 
stability concerns.16 Since then, Hong Kong has been on the march again, 
though there was a worldwide stock market crash in 1987 from which Hong 
Kong was not immune.17 Since the 1990s, the number of initial public offer-
ings (IPOs) in Hong Kong has increased significantly due to the influx of 
Chinese companies on to the exchange.18 
At present, Hong Kong is undoubtedly an international financial market. 
For example, Time Magazine coined the term “Nylonkong” to describe the 
extent to which New York, London and Hong Kong are linked by a shared 
economic culture, and how they have created a financial network that has 
come to be both an example and an explanation of globalization.19 The Fi-
nancial Times went so far as to replace New York and London with Shanghai, 
coining a new term “Shangkong,” following a shift in financial gravity to 
Asia.20 According to the Global Financial Centres Index (GFCI), Hong Kong 
has consistently remained in the top three financial centers since 2007, behind 
only London and New York. With a total market capitalization of about 24 
trillion HKD at the end of 2013, Hong Kong’s stock market ranked sixth in 
the world and second in Asia.21  
The ability of the bourse to attract new listings should particularly be 
noted. From 2009 to 2011, Hong Kong’s stock market led the world in raising 
                                                                                                                           
 12 See H.K. INFO. SERV. DEP’T, supra note 9, at 37. 
 13 SEC. & FUTURES COMMISSION, supra note 5, at 3. 
 14 RANALD C. MICHIE, THE GLOBAL SECURITIES MARKET 267 (2006). 
 15 See SEC. & FUTURES COMMISSION, supra note 5, at 8. 
 16 MICHIE, supra note 14, at 267. 
 17 SEC. & FUTURES COMMISSION, supra note 5, at 27. 
 18 See Horace Yeung & Xiao Huang, Law and Finance: What Matters? Hong Kong as a Test 
Case, 3 ASIAN J. L. & ECON. 1, 7 (2012).  
 19 See Michael Elliott, A Tale of Three Cities, TIME (Jan. 17, 2008) http://content.time.com/
time/magazine/article/0,9171,1704398,00.html, archived at http://perma.cc/Y3L9-8GXJ. 
 20 Jeffrey Garten, Amid Economic Rubble, Shangkong Will Rise, FIN. TIMES (May 11, 2009) 
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/dfbd55ea-3d8c-11de-a85e-00144feabdc0.html#axzz3TqEhT2W4, archived 
at http://perma.cc/HZ3T-BNJQ. 
 21 See H.K. INFO. SERV. DEP’T, supra note 9, at 58. 
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funds through IPOs.22 Despite a drop in performance thereafter, in 2013 the 
city remained second worldwide in terms of attracting IPO funds.23 
B. Hong Kong’s Economic Relationship with China 
Under British rule, Hong Kong’s economy prospered. In contrast, since 
the Communist Party came to power in 1949, Chinese society has been large-
ly closed off from the outside world and economic development has been 
significantly hindered. Hong Kong has played a pivotal role throughout Chi-
na’s various stages of development, ranging from a supplier of vital supplies, 
a trade middleman, and finally a financial center.24 When the Communist 
Party of China came to power in 1949, it inherited a poor agrarian society 
consisting mainly of millions of small-scale self-sufficient farming house-
holds. China imported most of the strategic supplies from Hong Kong during 
the Korean War, amid a trade embargo by the United Nations.25 
Following the calamity of the Great Leap Forward strategy and the Cul-
tural Revolution, the state advocated a fundamental re-orientation of China’s 
development strategy and marked a new era of economic reform and open-
door policy.26 The open-door policy is a vital part of China’s new develop-
ment strategy of intensive growth and the motivational force for reform. The 
commitment to the open-door policy forced China to modify a rigid econom-
ic system to facilitate economic interactions with world markets. The role of 
Hong Kong in this process has been pivotal and can be summarized into four 
main functions: financier, trading partner, middleman, and facilitator.27 
Hong Kong is the predominant source of foreign finance in China. Hong 
Kong has provided China with a number of different loans: first direct lend-
ing; second, loan syndication; and finally, lending from Hong Kong banks to 
non-bank customers in China.28 The combined shares of direct loans and syn-
dicated loans from Hong Kong ranged from one-third to two-thirds of China’s 
commercial loans in the period between 1984 to 1987.29 After 1990, Hong 
Kong added a new aspect to its financing in China by providing a fundraising 
platform for Chinese companies. 
                                                                                                                           
 22 H.K. INFO. SERV. DEP’T, GOVERNMENT YEARBOOK 2011, at 73 (2012), available at http://
www.yearbook.gov.hk/2011/en/pdf/E04.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/4NGG-J585. 
 23 See H.K. INFO. SERV. DEP’T, supra note 9, at 58–59. 
 24 YUN-WING SUNG, THE CHINA-HONG KONG CONNECTION: THE KEY TO CHINA’S OPEN-
DOOR POLICY 5–6, 16–17, 26 (1991). 
 25 See id. at 5. 
 26 See id. at 6. 
 27 Id. at 16–17. 
 28 See id.  
 29 Id. at 95–97. 
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In July 1993, Tsingtao Brewery, which produces the famous Chinese 
Tsingtao beer, became the first Chinese company ever to be listed on the 
Hong Kong Stock Exchange (HKEx).30 The Hong Kong stock market used to 
be dependent on the property sector, but now has a more diversified structure 
because of the increasing importance of Chinese companies from a variety of 
sectors.31 For example, the property sector accounted for 31 percent of total 
market capitalization at the end of 1996, but by 2004, this sector only ac-
counted for 11 percent.32 In contrast, Chinese companies now have an over-
whelmingly important presence on the stock exchange. At the end of 2013, 
out of 1,643 public companies listed on the HKEx, 797 of them were from 
China. 33 The importance of Chinese companies reached its peak between 
2007–2008 when they accounted for over half of the HKEx’s total market 
capitalization, but this number declined to around 40 percent as of mid-2014. 
The trend came as a result of HKEx’s attempt to diversify the sources of issu-
ers. Until late 2006, the HKEx would only accept listing applications from 
companies incorporated in a few jurisdictions such as Hong Kong, China, the 
Cayman Islands, and Bermuda.34 As of this moment, there are twenty-one 
acceptable overseas jurisdictions.35 
It is undeniable that the influx of Chinese companies has been the cata-
lyst for Hong Kong to evolve into an international finance center. Fueled by 
global investors’ desire to have a share of China’s impressive economic 
growth, the presence of overseas institutional investors in Hong Kong has 
increased dramatically. Local retail investors were the major contributors to 
the Hong Kong market in the 1990s and were responsible for the largest pro-
portion of market turnover value among all types of investors until 2000.36 
Since 2000, local retail investors have ceded their dominant position to over-
seas institutional investors. Measured by turnover value, the largest group of 
overseas participants is investors from the United States, followed by inves-
                                                                                                                           
 30 See Yeung & Huang, supra note 18, at 20.  
 31 Joseph Lee & Joanna Poon, The Listing of Mainland Companies on HKEx and the Implica-
tions for Hong Kong, SEC. & FUTURES COMMISSION 1 (Sept. 2004), http://www.sfc.hk/web/doc/EN/
research/research/rs%20paper%2017.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/Q4LS-KKP8. 
 32 Id. at 2. 
 33 See H.K. INFO. SERV. DEP’T, supra note 9, at 58–59. 
 34 Horace Yeung & Xiao Huang, Regulatory Cooperation Between Securities Commissions: 
A Reflection from Hong Kong, 1 CHINESE J. COMP. L. 112, 153 (2013). 
 35 List of Acceptable Overseas Jurisdictions, HKEX, http://www.hkex.com.hk/eng/rulesreg/
listrules/listsptop/listoc/list_of_aoj.htm (last updated July 14, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/
97GM-2K8L. 
 36 Essie Tsoi, Understanding Investors in the Hong Kong Listed Securities and Derivatives 
Markets, SEC. & FUTURES COMMISSION 3 (July 2004) http://www.sfc.hk/web/doc/EN/research/
research/extpaper05%20%28eng%29.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/T52E-Y7UK. 
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tors from the United Kingdom.37 Investors from the rest of Europe have also 
expanded their participation.38  
With so many foreign participants, the regulatory authorities in Hong 
Kong are committed to maintaining a stringent regulatory standard, since 
Hong Kong is now heavily financial services-oriented. Because market-
oriented companies seeking demutualization dominate the Exchange, transac-
tions risk losing revenue if they fail to compete. This drive for profit arguably 
carries the risk of increasing the scope and intensity of conflict.39 Further-
more, the Exchange may have less incentive to commit resources for self-
enforcement or to take enforcement action against its customers or users who 
are a source of income.40 Questions have been raised on inherent conflicts of 
interest for the Exchanges’ dual roles as market operators and regulators.41 
Hong Kong’s continued success may hinge on whether it can maintain its 
image as a sound and robust financial market. 
II. HONG KONG’S ECONOMIC, FINANCIAL & REGULATORY  
SYSTEM AS PART OF CHINA 
In 1982, Deng Xiaoping first applied the idea of “one country two sys-
tems” to Hong Kong, as originally proposed by Ye Jianying, Chairman of the 
Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress to facilitate the peace-
ful national reunification of China and Taiwan: 
To maintain Hong Kong’s prosperity basically depends upon our 
proposals that China will adopt the policies that are fit for Hong 
Kong after she resumes the exercise of sovereignty over Hong 
Kong. Hong Kong’s current political and economic systems and 
even most of its laws can remain unchanged. Certainly, some 
should be revised and reformed. Hong Kong will still maintain its 
                                                                                                                           
 37 Id. at 15. 
 38 Id. 
 39 See Reena Aggarwal, Demutualization and Corporate Governance of Stock Exchanges, 15 J. 
APPLIED CORP. FIN. 105, 106 (2002); Andreas Fleckner, Stock Exchanges at the Crossroads, 74 
FORDHAM L. REV. 2541, 2543–44 (2006). But see Ruben Lee, The Future of Securities Exchanges, 
WHARTON FIN. INST. CTR. 15 (Feb. 26, 2002), http://www.oxfordfinancegroup.com/media/10341/lee
%20future%20securities%20exchanges%202002.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/WP9L-EG9Q (stat-
ing that alternatively, many exchanges have claimed that demutualization would give them an added 
incentive to maintain high regulatory standards which can attract more business, thereby increasing 
revenues). 
 40 See Aggarwal, supra note 39, at 109. 
 41 See id.; Fleckner, supra note 39, at 2543. 
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capitalist system. Many present systems that are suitable should 
remain unchanged.42 
On December 19, 1984, Chinese Premier Zhao Ziyang and British 
Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, on behalf of their respective governments, 
signed the Sino-British Joint Declaration, which reflected the basic principles 
and policies of “one country two systems.”43 The Joint Declaration mandated 
that the United Kingdom relinquish Hong Kong to Chinese sovereignty on 
July 1, 1997, and obligated China to establish the territory as a “Special Ad-
ministrative Region” (SAR).44 As such, the territory would “enjoy a high de-
gree of autonomy, except in foreign and defense affairs which are the respon-
sibilities of the Central People’s Government.”45 
Most importantly, the Joint Declaration formed the foundation of the 
Basic Law of Hong Kong, which is known as the “mini-constitution.” On the 
one hand, Hong Kong’s long history as an Asian financial center strengthened 
its credentials. On the other hand, the Basic Law also played a role in main-
taining Hong Kong’s position by expressly stating that the socialist system 
and policies in China must not be practiced in Hong Kong and the established 
capitalist system must remain unchanged for 50 years after the handover.46  
The principles of “one country two systems” have reaffirmed the inde-
pendence of Hong Kong in a number of respects. In principle, Chinese laws 
and policies are not applied in Hong Kong.47 Article 8 of the Basic Law stipu-
lates that: 
The laws previously in force in Hong Kong, that is, the common 
law, rules of equity, ordinances, subordinate legislation and cus-
tomary law shall be maintained, except for any that contravene this 
Law, and subject to any amendment by the legislature of the Hong 
Kong Special Administrative Region.48 
This Article contends that there is a potential “regulatory gap” between 
the corporate and financial law systems of Hong Kong and China, and argues 
                                                                                                                           
 42 BASIC LAW PROMOTION STEERING COMMITTEE, THE BASIC LAW AND HONG KONG: 15TH 
ANNIVERSARY OF UNIFICATION WITH THE MOTHERLAND 10 (2012), available at http://www.
basiclaw.gov.hk/en/publications/book/15anniversary_reunification_ch1_1.pdf, archived at http://
perma.cc/TYS3-ERMB.  
 43 See id. at 13.  
 44 Joint Declaration on the Question of Hong Kong § 3(2), China-U.K, Dec. 19, 1984, 1399 
U.N.T.S. 33; BASIC LAW PROMOTION STEERING COMMITTEE, supra note 42, at 13.  
 45 See Joint Declaration on the Question of Hong Kong, supra note 44, § 3(2).  
 46 XIANGGANG JIBEN FA art. 5 (H.K.); XIANFA art. 6 (2004) (China) (stating that the basis of 
the socialist economic system of the People’s Republic of China is socialist public ownership of 
the means of production). 
 47 See XIANGGANG JIBEN FA art. 18, Annex III (H.K.). 
 48 See id. art. 8. 
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that Hong Kong’s advantage has largely come from the operation of a regula-
tory regime independent of the one in China. The legal framework of both 
systems will be compared in the next two parts. 
III. THE GENERAL LEGAL FRAMEWORK OF THE TWO JURISDICTIONS 
The interrelationship between law and financial development are at the 
core of law and finance studies.49 Rafael La Porta and colleagues have exam-
ined legal rules addressing the protection of corporate shareholders and credi-
tors, the origin of these rules, and the quality of their enforcement in forty-
nine countries.50 They have alleged that the legal environment, including both 
legal rules and their enforcement, matters for the size and extent of a coun-
try’s capital market.51 A good legal environment protects the potential finan-
ciers against expropriation by entrepreneurs.52 As a result, investors are will-
ing to surrender funds in exchange for securities, thereby expanding the scope 
of capital markets.53 The advantage of good regulation is also confirmed by 
the bonding hypothesis proposed by John Coffee.54 According to this theory, 
instead of going for a lower cost and less demanding regulatory structure, 
companies tend to choose an internationally renowned market, generally with 
higher entry and ongoing requirements.55 They comply voluntarily with a 
high level of disclosure and corporate governance standards.56 In this way, a 
company may potentially benefit from an increase in its share price and the 
ability to raise capital at a lower cost.57 
A. Hong Kong 
Fundamentally, Hong Kong’s regulatory system is stronger than China’s. 
The development of Hong Kong’s corporate and financial law regime has a 
close connection with its historical status as a British colony.58 The genesis of 
                                                                                                                           
 49 Mathias Siems, Legal Origins: Reconciling Law & Finance and Comparative Law, 52 
MCGILL L. J. 55, 57 (2007). 
 50 See Rafael La Porta et al., Legal Determinants of External Finance 52 J. FIN. 1131, 1131–
32 (1997). But see Daniel Berkowitz et al., Economic Development, Legality and the Transplant 
Effect, 47 EUR. ECON. REV. 165, 166–67 (2003); John Armour et al., Shareholder Protection and 
Stock Market Development: An Empirical Test of the Legal Origins Hypothesis, 6 J. EMPIRICAL 
LEGAL STUD. 343, 344 (2009). 
 51 La Porta et al., supra note 52, at 1132. 
 52 Id. 
 53 Id. 
 54 See John C. Coffee, Racing Towards the Top?: The Impact of Cross-Listings and Stock 
Market Competition on International Corporate Governance, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1757, 1780–83 
(2002). 
 55 See id. 
 56 See id.  
 57 See id. at 1783.  
 58 See Yeung & Huang, supra note 18, at 9.  
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the current corporate law framework is the Companies Ordinance (CO) of 
1865 that mirrored the English Companies Act of 1862, which in turn incor-
porated both the Joint Stock Companies Registration and Regulation Act of 
1844 and the Limited Liability Act of 1855.59 Likewise, the Companies Act of 
1908 in the United Kingdom was followed by the Companies Ordinance of 
1911 in Hong Kong. The CO was designated as Chapter (Cap) 32 in 1933. 
After 1933, no further significant legislative initiative in company law was 
introduced until 1984, which reflected the Companies Act of 1948.60 Since 
then, the law has constantly been revised.61 Other related rules and regula-
tions include the Listing Rules of the HKEx, as well as the Code on Corpo-
rate Governance Practices and the Code on Takeovers and Mergers. Fur-
thermore, the substantive legal framework in Hong Kong to protect investors 
and promote market efficiency mirrors the United Kingdom’s common law 
system of investor protection.62 For example, both common law and statutory 
law impose certain duties on company directors.63 Directors owe fiduciary 
duties, which are based upon showing the utmost good faith. 64  The new 
Companies Ordinance in Hong Kong was published in August 2012 and en-
tered into force in March 2014.65 The new law aims to achieve four main ob-
jectives: to enhance corporate governance, ensure better regulations, facilitate 
business and modernize the law.66 
Formal regulation of securities law started in 1974 when a market crash 
attracted government attention and led to the introduction of legislation.67 
That same year, the Securities Ordinance and the Protection of Investors Or-
dinance became effective. 68 In 1987, when the world’s securities markets 
braced themselves for another crash, the Hong Kong government recognized 
the need to strengthen its systems and regulatory arrangements to maintain its 
position as the foremost Asian capital market.69 The 1987 crash led to the 
                                                                                                                           
 59 MINKANG GU, UNDERSTANDING CHINESE COMPANY LAW 10 (2006). 
 60 See Companies (Winding Up and Miscellaneous Provisions) Ordinance, (2014) Cap. 32, 1 
(H.K.); John H. Farrar, Developing Corporate Governance in Greater China, 25 U. N. S. WALES 
L.J. 462, 474 (2002).  
 61 See Farrar, supra note 60, at 474.  
 62 See Yeung & Huang, supra note 18, at 10. 
 63 See id. at 11. 
 64 See id.  
 65 Companies Ordinance Rewrite, FIN. SERVICES & TREASURY BUREAU H.K., http://www.
fstb.gov.hk/fsb/co_rewrite/eng/home/home.htm (last updated Feb. 20, 2014), archived at http://
perma.cc/ZLN7-PTH5. 
 66 New Companies Ordinance Overview, COMPANIES REGISTRY H.K., http://www.cr.gov.hk/
en/companies_ordinance/overview.htm (last updated Mar. 3, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/
HP5B-U7JQ. 
 67 SEC. & FUTURES COMMISSION, supra note 5, at 11.  
 68 Id. 
 69 See id. at 32. 
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appointment of the Securities Review Committee.70 The Securities and Fu-
tures Commission Ordinance, which passed its final reading in 1989, marked 
the beginning of a strong single regulator.71 In 1991, the Securities (Disclo-
sure of Interests) Ordinance and Securities (Insider Dealing) Ordinance came 
into force.72 In 2003, the Securities and Futures Ordinance (SFO) consolidat-
ed and modernized all of the previous ordinances regulating the securities 
markets in Hong Kong.73 The Securities and Futures Commission (SFC) is 
recognized under the SFO as an autonomous statutory body and is responsi-
ble for regulating the securities and futures markets in Hong Kong.74 
B. China 
Until the Company Law came into effect on July 1, 1994, shareholding 
companies and the securities market operated in China without either compa-
ny law or securities law.75 Regulation consisted of piecemeal rules issued by 
different governmental entities. Before 1994, the Standard Opinion on Lim-
ited Liability Companies and the Standard Opinion on Companies Limited by 
Shares served as interim measures before the promulgation of a comprehen-
sive set of company laws.76 Based on previous draft regulations and the two 
standard opinions, the Company Law passed by the National People’s Con-
gress on December 29, 1993, and served two main functions: (i) to establish a 
modern enterprise system compatible with the social market economy and (ii) 
to set out the legal basis for regulating different types of companies.77 The 
Company Law has since been slightly amended twice, in 1999 and 2004, and 
been subject to more radical changes introduced in 2005 and 2013.78 
Even though both stock exchanges in Shanghai and Shenzhen were es-
tablished in the early 1990s, the first set of securities laws did not come into 
                                                                                                                           
 70 Id. 
 71 See id. at 55. 
 72 See Yeung & Huang, supra note 18, at 9. 
 73 See id. 
 74 H.K. INFO. SERV. DEP’T, supra note 23, at 91. 
 75 JIANG YU WANG, COMPANY LAW IN CHINA 6–7 (2014). 
 76 See id.; Le Jiachun, China’s Bond Market, in CHINA’S FINANCIAL MARKETS: AN INSID-
ER’S GUIDE TO HOW THE MARKETS WORK 158 (Salih N. Neftci & Michelle Yuan Menager-Xu 
eds., 2007). 
 77 See WANG, supra note 75, at 6–7. 
 78 Id. (explaining that the recent company law amendments removed the requirement for 
companies to have a minimum level of capitalization and that it is expected to encourage more 
entrepreneurs to start their own businesses fostering the growth of the individual economic sec-
tor.); see China’s Amended Company Law Facilitating More Business, PRICEWATERHOUSECOOP-
ERS CONSULTANTS (SHENZEN) (Jan. 2014), http://www.pwccn.com/webmedia/doc/63525318078
6908970_chinatax_news_jan2014_1.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/9VG9-LZBD. 
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effect until 1999.79 This pattern of development can be attributed to the Chi-
nese tendency to subordinate law to government authority exercising detailed 
administrative control over economic activities rather than permitting these 
activities to be defined by law.80 Like the Company Law, positive changes in 
the regulatory framework were made through revisions to the Securities Law 
in 2005.81 Shareholders’ rights overall were significantly strengthened.82 The 
regulator in China is the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC). 
IV. A COMPARISON OF THE SPECIFIC ASPECTS OF THE REGULATION 
Jurisdictions regulate publicly held companies in recognition of the vul-
nerability of public investors. The two major principles are: first, to ensure 
that the prices of publicly traded securities are reasonably well-informed; and 
second, to control the quality of publicly traded securities and ensure effective 
corporate governance arrangements protect public shareholders.83 According-
ly, three legal strategies are employed to protect the interests of investors: the 
entry strategy, the trusteeship strategy, and the rules and standards strategy.84 
First, the entry strategy requires mandatory disclosure for new issues of 
shares, as well as other specific ongoing disclosures for listed companies.85 
An offer for the sale or subscription of shares must be mandatorily disclosed 
via a prospectus, which is a document provided to potential investors, and is 
important because it contains the information they need to decide whether or 
not to invest.86 The additional requirements of ongoing disclosure are also 
essential to other legal mechanisms used to protect shareholders.87 For exam-
ple, the disclosure of self-dealing transactions between the company and its 
directors, coupled with the requirement to obtain the shareholders’ approval 
on these transactions, can be critical to controlling the opportunistic behavior 
of managers.88  
Second, the trusteeship strategy empowers a disinterested third party to 
screen companies that wish to enter the stock market.89 Stock exchanges, for 
                                                                                                                           
 79 See CHINA SEC. REG. COMMISSION, CHINA CAPITAL MARKETS DEVELOPMENT REPORT, 174, 
250 (2008), available at http://www.csrc.gov.cn/pub/csrc_en/Informations/publication/200911/P0
20091103520222505841.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/B6VL-KHNK. 
 80 Iain MacNeil, Adaptation and Convergence in Corporate Governance: The Case of Chi-
nese Listed Companies, 2 J. CORP. L. STUD. 289, 301 (2002). 
 81 CHINA SEC. REG. COMMISSION, supra note 79, at 174, 250.  
 82 WANG, supra note 75, at 6–7. 
 83 See Gerard Hertig et al., Issuers and Investor Protection, in THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE 
LAW: A COMPARATIVE AND FUNCTIONAL APPROACH 193 (Kraakman et al. eds., 2004). 
 84 Id. at 194. 
 85 See id. at 195–97. 
 86 See id. at 199. 
 87 See id. at 204–07. 
 88 See id. 
 89 Id. at 207. 
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instance, through their listing review process, can be regarded as the guardian 
of quality.90  
Finally, the rules and standards strategy concerns the acceptable charac-
teristics and behavior of listed companies.91 They are usually employed in 
conjunction with the previous two strategies. For example, stock exchanges 
will review listing applications in accordance with certain recognizable stand-
ards stated in the listing rules.92 Similarly, to ensure the reliability of corporate 
disclosures, a misrepresentation must be clearly specified and offenders must 
be held responsible through the use of standards backed by liability.93 
The manner in which China and Hong Kong have employed the three 
major legal strategies is of relevance to this Article and will be examined one 
by one. Although new company laws were introduced in 2014 in both China 
and Hong Kong, the discussion here will be made with reference to earlier 
laws which were largely responsible for the market growth to date. 
A. Entry Strategy 
The entry strategy concerns both the initial and subsequent disclosures 
of companies.94 The key mechanism of the initial disclosures is a prospec-
tus.95 In the case of a listing and the subsequent public offer, it is necessary to 
consider the filing requirements under both company and securities law as 
well as under the listing rules. The production of a prospectus generally in-
volves the coordinated efforts of various parties involved in the listing pro-
cesses as well as subsequent verification by the relevant regulatory authori-
ties. This is an illustration of how the entry strategy and trusteeship strategy 
can work together. 
1. Prospectus 
The prospectus drafting involves a spectrum of parties such as company 
management, staff, underwriters, lawyers, and accountants. In Hong Kong, 
specific requirements for the information in a prospectus are set out in Chap-
ter 11 and Appendix 1 of the Listing Rules.96 Additionally, the requirements 
                                                                                                                           
 90 See id. at 208. 
 91 Id. at 208–09. 
 92 See id. at 209–10. 
 93 See id. at 210–12. 
 94 See id. at 195–96. 
 95 See id. at 199. 
 96 See generally Chapter 11: Listing Documents, H.K. EXCHANGES & CLEARING LTD. (July 7, 
2014), https://www.hkex.com.hk/eng/rulesreg/listrules/mbrules/documents/chapter_11.pdf, archived 
at https://perma.cc/3AEC-35PF (outlining the specific requirements for the information provided in a 
prospectus); Appendix 1, H.K. EXCHANGES & CLEARING LTD. (July 11, 2014), https://www.hkex.
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stipulated in the Companies Ordinance (CO) must also be taken into ac-
count.97 All of these requirements under the Listing Rules and the CO, how-
ever, are not mutually exclusive and overlap regarding the content required. 
In general, information about the issuer and its management, the securities for 
which listing is sought, the issuer’s financial position, the intended use of 
proceeds, its business activities, and a list of its advisers is required.98 
Following drafting, underwriters perform due diligence to establish the 
completeness and accuracy of the information contained in the prospectus. 
Practice Note 21 of the HKEx sets out the steps a sponsor must undertake to 
fulfill its responsibilities.99 Authorization must then be sought from the SFC 
by providing a copy of the prospectus signed by the directors, with certain 
specified endorsements thereon. If approved, the SFC will transfer the case to 
the HKEx. If not, the SFC has the power to require further information from 
the company and raise an objection to the listing.100 Grounds for objection 
can be, for instance, that the prospectus does not provide sufficiently detailed 
information on the company and its affairs for an investor to make an in-
formed decision or that the application is false or misleading as to a material 
fact or omission of a material fact.101 The reason can also be as general as that 
the SFC considers it not in the public interest for the securities to be listed.102 
The HKEx will also play an active role in raising questions about the 
contents of the prospectus. This demonstrates how the entry strategy can be 
employed in conjunction with the trusteeship strategy, which will be dis-
cussed later. 
By comparison, a comprehensive set of legal procedures for producing a 
prospectus is a relatively recent advancement in China. The prospectus rule is 
mainly governed by Criteria No. 1 on the Content and Format of Information 
Disclosure by Companies Conducting Public Offer of Securities–Prospectus, 
which was significantly revised in 2006.103 Prior to that, the CSRC and the 
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 97 See Companies (Winding Up and Miscellaneous Provisions) Ordinance, (2014) Cap. 32, 9–
11, § 38 (H.K.). 
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 99 Practice Note 21 to the Rules Governing the Listing of Securities, H.K. EXCHANGES & 
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 100 Securities and Futures (Stock Market Listing) Rules, (2003) Cap. 571V, 2–3, § 6 (H.K.). 
Under SMLR rule 6(4), the HKEx is prohibited from listing any company to which the SFC has 
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 101 Id. §§ 3C, 6. 
 102 Id. § 6. 
 103 Criterion No. 1 on the Content and Format of Information Disclosure by Companies Con-
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company were the two major entities involved. A sponsorship system for 
stock issuance, which will be discussed in the trusteeship strategy section, 
was not put into place in China until 2003.104 The company applying for the 
initial public offer of shares and listing within China must produce a prospec-
tus to the CSRC.105 All the information disclosed by the issuer in the prospec-
tus and its abstract must be true, accurate, and complete. Any omission of 
matters or any relevant subsequent events after the submission of the draft 
prospectus must be explained to the CSRC.106 
The prospectus rule specifies the required information that must be in-
cluded in a prospectus.107 Although the truthfulness, accuracy, and complete-
ness of the prospectus is the primary responsibility of management, the spon-
sors, lawyers, and accountants involved in the listing process are required to 
examine and verify the prospectus and declare that they have duly performed 
their duties.108 By placing more reliance on market intermediaries and lessen-
ing the burden on the CSRC, this accountability mechanism has clearly been 
a new initiative in China. 
Both Hong Kong and China will hold the responsible parties liable in 
cases of misstatement or material omission. In Hong Kong, a statement in-
cluded in a prospectus is deemed to be untrue if it is misleading in the form 
and context in which it is included.109 This also includes a material omission 
from the prospectus.110 An untrue statement can give rise to a range of poten-
tial liabilities involving administrative, civil, and criminal sanctions. The List-
ing Rules provide that each of the directors of the company is required to ac-
cept responsibility for the information contained in the listing document and 
include in the listing document a statement to that effect.111 Failure to comply 
with the prospectus requirements can render the company and any responsi-
ble entities liable for a fine.112 Under the CO, civil liability is imposed on cer-
tain categories of persons to pay compensation to investors, who applied for 
the securities on the faith of the prospectus and suffered loss because of the 
untrue or misleading statement in the prospectus.113 Furthermore, under the 
                                                                                                                           
 104 YEUNG & HUANG, supra note 103, at 113. 
 105 Criterion No. 1, art. 2. 
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 107 YEUNG & HUANG, supra note 103, at 111.  
 108 Criterion No. 1, arts. 121–24. 
 109 Companies (Winding Up and Miscellaneous Provisions) Ordinance, (2014) Cap. 32, 18–
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 110 Id. §§ 41A(2), 343(2)(A). 
 111 Chapter 11: Listing Documents, supra note 96, at 11.12.  
 112 Companies (Winding Up and Miscellaneous Provisions) Ordinance, (2014) Cap. 32, 9–11, 
§ 38, (H.K.). 
 113 Id. § 40. The following people are potentially liable: (1) every director of the company at 
the time of the issue of the prospectus; (2) a promoter of the company (being any person who is a 
party to the preparation of the prospectus); (3) every person who has authorized the issue of the 
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SFO, a person who makes a fraudulent, reckless, or negligent misrepresenta-
tion in a prospectus can be liable to pay compensation where a person has 
invested in reliance on such misrepresentation and suffers a pecuniary loss as 
a result.114 Criminal liability can also be imposed on any person who author-
izes the issuance of a prospectus containing an untrue statement or a material 
omission.115 The intent to defraud by the deliberate or reckless making of a 
false statement of a material fact can even constitute fraud.116 
Similarly, China operates a system comprising administrative, civil, and 
criminal sanctions. The Securities Law of China states that the information 
disclosed by any issuer and listed company must be true, accurate, and com-
plete, and must not contain any false record, misleading statement, or major 
omission.117 Unfortunately, how the provision should be enforced was not 
clarified until 2003. The Several Provisions of the Supreme People’s Court on 
Hearing Civil Compensation Cases Arising from False Statement on the Se-
curities Market provided a precise definition.118 False statements are state-
ments made by wrongdoers in information disclosure or announcements 
through the media, which influence investors to make a wrong estimation and 
result in significant detriment to their investment.119 In contrast, a material 
omission is the failure to disclose, either wholly or partially, the required in-
formation by one with the duty to act.120 The Securities Law clearly states the 
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possible administrative penalties for the offense.121 Meanwhile, the potential 
joint civil liabilities of the issuer, management personnel of the issuer, spon-
sors, and underwriters are mentioned in Article 69 of the Securities Law.122 
For offenses involving criminal elements, the offenders can face imprison-
ment for up to five years.123 
2. Ongoing Disclosures 
As for their ongoing disclosure obligations, listed companies are gener-
ally required to disclose their financial and operating conditions to the pub-
lic.124 In Hong Kong, apart from the regulation of prospectuses, listed com-
panies are required under the CO to maintain proper accounting records, pre-
pare them in a specified form, ensure that they present a true and fair view of 
the state of affairs of the company, and present them to their members.125 
This form of information disclosure is generally in the format of annual re-
ports and accounts as well as interim reports.126 Specific content requirements 
for annual reports and accounts are set out in Appendix 16 of the Listing 
Rules.127 The Listing Rules also contain a number of provisions obligating 
companies to keep shareholders and the wider market informed.128 Certain 
transactions, whether proposed or undertaken by a company, must be dis-
                                                                                                                           
 121 Securities Law of the People’s Republic of China (2014 Amendment), art. 193. (stating 
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disclosed as soon as reasonably practicable). 
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closed to shareholders and potentially may require their prior approval.129 
This is an example of how mandatory disclosure can work alongside other 
legal strategies, such as the decision rights of a shareholder. Such transactions 
can fall into two categories: notifiable transactions and connected transac-
tions.130 The former generally concerns the magnitude of a transition in which 
quantitative tests are applied to determine the nature and level of disclosure 
required.131 Examples of a notifiable transaction are substantial acquisitions 
and disposals.132 Connected transactions refer to those that involve persons 
closely connected with the company, who are prohibited from abusing their 
positions with the company.133 Examples of a connected person include any 
director, chief executive, or substantial shareholder as defined in the Listing 
Rules.134 For every disclosable transaction, the company is required to notify 
the HKEx and make an announcement in a local newspaper.135 In some cases, 
shareholders’ approval is essential before the transaction can proceed. 136 
Broadly speaking, a company must report, make announcements, and seek 
the approval of shareholders unless a waiver is sought from the HKEx for a 
connected transaction.137 
By contrast, the problem associated with ongoing disclosures in China is 
that state-owned listed companies are exempt from disclosing certain transac-
tions. The information disclosure system in China is based on the Securities 
Law, Company Law, listing rules, and other relevant supplementary regulato-
ry documents such as the Administrative Measures on Information Disclosure 
of Listed Companies.138 Companies must establish their own financial and 
                                                                                                                           
 129 See id. at 13.36.  
 130 See Chapter 14: Notifiable Transactions, H.K. EXCHANGES & CLEARING LTD. (July 7, 
2014), https://www.hkex.com.hk/eng/rulesreg/listrules/mbrules/documents/chapter_14.pdf, archived 
at https://perma.cc/2V9X-H56K; Chapter 14A: Connected Transactions, H.K. EXCHANGES & 
CLEARING LTD. (July 7, 2014), https://www.hkex.com.hk/eng/rulesreg/listrules/mbrules/documents/
chapter_14a.pdf, archived at https://perma.cc/K9PQ-FSMR. 
 131 See Chapter 14: Notifiable Transactions, supra note 130, at 14.06.  
 132 Id. at 14.01. 
 133 See Chapter 14A: Connected Transactions, supra note 130, at 14A.07. 
 134 Id.  
 135 Id. at 14A.03. 
 136 Chapter 14: Notifiable Transactions, supra note 130, at 14.44, 14.18, 14.46, 14.54 (stating 
that in general, shareholders may approve a transaction by a majority vote in a general meeting 
and that shareholders and their associates who have a material interest in a notifiable or connected 
transaction should abstain from voting).  
 137 Chapter 14A: Connected Transactions, supra note 130, at 14A.03, 14A.73. 
 138 Shàngshì gōngsī xìnxī pīlù guǎnlǐ bànfǎ (上市公司信息披露管理办法) [Administrative 
Measures for the Disclosure of Information for Listed Companies] (promulgated by China Securi-
ties Regulatory Comm’n, Jan. 30, 2007) (China); Zhōnghuá rénmín gònghéguó gōngsī fǎ (2013 
xiūzhèng) (中華人民共和國公司法(2013修正)) [The Company Law of the People’s Republic of 
China] (issued by the Standing Comm. of the People’s National Cong., Dec. 28, 2013, effective 
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accounting systems and prepare reports at the end of each accounting year.139 
Listed companies must also submit their annual/interim reports and accounts 
to the CSRC and stock exchanges, which should consist of certain elements 
required by the law.140 Furthermore, ad hoc reports must be disclosed in a 
timely manner when the share price of the company might be substantially 
affected by certain significant matters such as decisions on major investments 
and asset acquisitions, decisions on reductions in capital, mergers, involve-
ment in a lawsuit, or applications for bankruptcy.141 Objective tests based on 
the value of a transaction are used to assess the materiality of a transaction.142 
For connected transactions, disclosure must be made according to the princi-
ple of importance, which stipulates the quantitative standards.143 Those noti-
fiable and connected transactions that triggered the disclosure obligation 
might require approval at the shareholders’ general meeting. When deciding 
on these transactions, the connected shareholders must avoid voting.144 Spe-
cific exemptions for disclosure and approval, however, can be sought from 
the stock exchanges and shareholders when the transactions involve daily 
operating activities.145 A general exemption is granted to state-owned listed 
companies.146 If a listed company and any connected parties are both under 
the control of the same state-owned asset administrative institution, they will 
not be deemed to have a connected relationship.147 This can have a broad ef-
fect because all SOEs, apart from financial institutions, are controlled by the 
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state-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the State 
Council. 
In summary, two major problems exist in the Chinese market, which are 
absent in Hong Kong, because of the dominance of SOEs and the inexperi-
ence of regulators. First, SOEs are exempt from disclosing certain connected 
transactions.148 This can be a potential hazard to investors’ interests and it is 
simply not fair to other listed non-SOEs. Second, China could have absorbed 
the experience of other developed markets to introduce a number of well-
drafted rules. The authorities, however, remain unsure about how to imple-
ment and enforce these rules. As a result, new rules have continuously been 
issued to explain the old rules, as exemplified by the Several Provisions of the 
Supreme People’s Court on Hearing Civil Compensation Cases Arising from 
False Statement on the Securities Market. It will take time for the Chinese 
authorities to master a steep learning curve. 
B. Trusteeship Strategy 
This section will move on to discuss how the trusteeship legal strategy 
has been adopted by China and Hong Kong. China is a beginner in this area 
because powers and responsibilities have long been concentrated in the hands 
of the CSRC. In general, issuers are required to go through a screening pro-
cess before they become listed. The interests of the investing public are the 
foremost priority when screening listing applications. An application can be 
refused if the listing might jeopardize investor interests. The party in charge 
of this process can differ. In China, the CSRC is still the primary authority in 
practice to approve listings, although the new Securities Law suggests other-
wise.149 Even the CSRC itself has criticized its current system as “prone to 
too much administrative control” because of the possible political interfer-
ence from other state entities.150  
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In Hong Kong, the SFC has delegated the duty to approve listings to the 
HKEx. The Listing Committee and the Listing Division of the HKEx under-
take the listing review and approval process. The composition of the Listing 
Committee is specified in the Listing Rules.151 It first grants or refuses ap-
proval to list before the process may progress to the Listing Division for re-
view.152 The Listing Division is responsible for all day-to-day listing matters 
including the interpretation, administration, and enforcement of the Listing 
Rules.153 
Similarly, an initial public offering in China requires CSRC approval.154 
The listing process starts with an application to the CSRC. After gaining the 
approval of the CSRC, the issuer can subsequently submit the documents to 
the relevant exchange for review, although this raises two potential con-
cerns.155 First, it is commonly believed that becoming listed is difficult unless 
the issuer has certain political connections, which was particularly true in the 
era of the quota system, discussed below. Second, potential conflicts of inter-
est exist because the CSRC favors some large SOEs. 
In line with its socialist market economy, China has tried to maintain 
tight control over its financial markets. This control has seriously restricted 
access to capital for many companies. In the early days of the Chinese stock 
market, the CSRC imposed a quota on the maximum number of shares that 
could be issued each year.156 The CSRC intended these quotas to curb poten-
tially excessive investment demand in a premature market, where participants 
had not developed an understanding of the market rules or their rights and 
obligations.157 Provincial governments and industry supervising bodies were 
assigned quotas and they would recommend companies for listing within 
them. The CSRC would then provide the final approval on public offer-
ings.158 
Eventually, this quota system was replaced when the Interim Regula-
tions on the Public Offering Review Committee of the CSRC entered into ef-
fect.159 The creation of the Public Offering Review Committee has been an 
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integral part of the new IPO approval system. It votes independently on list-
ing applications and offers review opinions.160 The Public Offering Review 
Committee, which is composed of mainly external members, attempts to offer 
a more objective view of the fitness of a company seeking to be listed. More-
over, potential conflicts of interest are eliminated by shifting reliance during 
the screening process away from the CSRC towards other third parties. Sub-
sequently, the CSRC makes the final decision on whether or not to approve 
the application in accordance with relevant conditions. 161  Ultimately, the 
stock exchange will also make a decision upon receipt of all the required 
documents from the issuer following CSRC approval based on the voting of 
its Listing Committee.162 
In 2003, the CSRC issued the Interim Measures for the Stock Issuance 
and Listing Sponsorship System, marking the beginning of the sponsor sys-
tem.163 This became a statutory requirement with the 2005 amendments to the 
Securities Law.164 The qualifications and duties of sponsors are stipulated in 
the Measures for the Administration of the Sponsor System for the Offering 
and Listing of Securities.165 Any parties who want to become a sponsor must 
register with the CSRC.166 In the listing process, a sponsor must act in good 
faith and with due diligence to conduct a full investigation of the issuer.167 In 
the course of the due diligence investigation, the sponsor must carefully ex-
amine the contents of the issuer’s application documents and prospectus. In 
China, the sponsor also takes up the role of compliance adviser.168 Once the 
issuer’s securities are listed, the sponsor must guide the issuer on an ongoing 
basis in performing obligations such as operation compliance and information 
disclosure.169 
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A sponsor is also required in Hong Kong.170 Every company seeking a 
listing in Hong Kong must appoint a sponsor, which can be a corporation or 
an authorized financial institution, licensed or registered to advise on corpo-
rate finance matters.171 Under the Listing Rules, the sponsor must be accepta-
ble to the HKEx, meaning the sponsor must be impartial and independent.172 
The sponsor must declare its impartiality and independence to the HKEx.173 
The sponsor’s role as watchdog is recognized by the Listing Rules.174 It must 
ensure that all information provided to the exchange during the listing process 
is true and complete.175 As part of the listing process, a due diligence exercise 
is performed, which involves a review of documentation and interviews of 
management, staff, and anyone deemed relevant.176 It also comprises of a 
physical inspection of assets.177 Various matters must be properly assessed, 
such as business feasibility, financial literacy, corporate governance experi-
ence, and competence of the directors.178 The Listing Rules also expressly 
address the role of compliance advisers.179 The function of the compliance 
adviser is to assist the newly listed issuer through the early stages of its life as 
a listed company, monitoring announcements, transactions, and activities, in 
particular, which might lead to regulatory consequences.180 
As noted earlier, Hong Kong has a much longer history in finance than 
mainland China; therefore, Hong Kong possesses a critical mass of expertise 
in financial services and related professional sectors. Meanwhile, China still 
requires some time to get up to speed. Since the inception of the sponsor sys-
tem in China, 67 securities companies and 609 professionals have successful-
ly registered.181 Unfortunately, the integrity of these sponsors remains ques-
tionable. For example, in 1997–2000, there were around 100 securities com-
panies in China, and more than half of them were involved in the embezzle-
ment of client funds.182 This might be a huge problem. As Gerard Hertig and 
colleagues have suggested, the vestigial characteristics of the trusteeship 
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strategy in major jurisdictions speak of the maturity of the public markets.183 
Whether the Chinese market possesses such maturity is doubtful. Still, it is 
certain that the Chinese market has become more liberal than ever before 
since the quota system was abolished. 
C. Rules and Standards Strategies 
As mentioned before, listing applications are screened by the competent 
authorities. Screening criteria are based on objective and observable stand-
ards. These can include, but are not limited to, the incorporation requirement, 
the profit, capitalization or revenue test, and the minimum public float. Other 
ongoing requirements will also be discussed. 
1. Initial Obligations 
A basic requirement for listing is that an issuer must be duly incorpo-
rated or otherwise validly established according to the relevant laws of its 
place of incorporation.184 This directly affects what jurisdiction will govern 
the affairs of a company from its formation to dissolution. The first step a 
company has to take in a listing is to set itself up as a public company. In 
Hong Kong, an issuer incorporated locally must not be a private company.185 
Companies that are incorporated overseas can list on the HKEx, but they are 
subject to the provisions of Part XII of the CO and Listing Rule 19, or 19A 
for Chinese companies.186 
In China, according to the Administrative Measures for the Initial Public 
Offering and Listing of Stocks (IPO Measures), the issuer must be a joint 
stock company limited by shares.187 In theory, the laws in China do not ex-
                                                                                                                           
 183 Hertig et al., supra note 83, at 208. 
 184 Chapter 8: Qualifications for Listing, H.K. EXCHANGES & CLEARING LTD. 8.02 (July 7, 
2014), https://www.hkex.com.hk/eng/rulesreg/listrules/mbrules/documents/chapter_8.pdf, archived at 
https://perma.cc/CVT2-7649. 
 185 See id. at 8.03.  
 186 Companies (Winding up and Miscellaneous Provisions) Ordinance, (2014) Cap. 32, § 342; 
Chapter 19: Overseas Issuers, H.K. EXCHANGES & CLEARING LTD. (July 7, 2014), https://www.
hkex.com.hk/eng/rulesreg/listrules/mbrules/documents/chapter_19.pdf, archived at https://perma.
cc/26VL-HXCC; Chapter 19A: Issuers Incorporated in the People’s Republic of China, H.K. 
EXCHANGES & CLEARING LTD. (July 7, 2014), https://www.hkex.com.hk/eng/rulesreg/listrules/mb
rules/documents/chapter_19a.pdf, archived at https://perma.cc/TK2F-BPSZ. 
 187 Shǒucì gōngkāi fāxíng gǔpiào bìng shàngshì guǎnlǐ bànfǎ (首次公开发行股票并上市管理
办法) [Administrative Measures for the Initial Public Offering and Listing of Stocks] (issued by 
China Securities Regulatory Comm., May 17, 2006), art. 8 (China); Zhōnghuá rénmín gònghéguó 
gōngsī fǎ (2013 xiūzhèng) (中華人民共和國公司法(2013修正)) [The Company Law of the Peo-
ple’s Republic of China] (issued by the Standing Comm. of the People’s National Cong., Dec. 28, 
2013, effective Mar. 1, 2014), arts. 24, 72 (China). A company limited by liability, unlike a joint 
stock company limited by shares, must be invested in and established by not more than fifty 
shareholders. See The Company Law of the People’s Republic of China, art. 24, 72. Art. 72 states 
2015] Hong Kong: One Country Two Systems 215 
pressly prohibit foreign companies from issuing and listing shares in Chi-
na.188 In practice, however, the prevailing view is that the issuer must be a 
company limited by shares that has been incorporated in China in accordance 
with the Company Law.189 At present, it is unlikely that the CSRC will ap-
prove a foreign company for listing. This is consistent with the pervading 
image of the Chinese market that it is still relatively closed whereas Hong 
Kong’s growth has relied on international trade and finance for over 100 
years. 
Furthermore, the basic commercial rationale for raising capital requires 
investors to be sufficiently interested in the company. The first thing for any 
company and for the stock exchange to consider is whether the company is 
qualified for listing. This will ensure the ex ante quality of publicly traded 
securities (for ex post quality, appropriate standards for listed companies 
come into play). In Hong Kong, the requirements are outlined in Chapter 8 of 
the Listing Rules.190 The HKEx considers the suitability of the company and 
its business for listing. The company will need to satisfy one of three quanti-
tative tests: the profit test, the market capitalization test, or the revenue test.191 
Broadly speaking, this means that the company must have an adequate trad-
ing record of at least three financial years.192 Also, there should be a sufficient 
amount of profit attributable to shareholders in the most recent years.193 Re-
garding market capitalization, the company should have at least 2 billion 
HKD at the time of listing.194 Furthermore, it must have a turnover of at least 
500 million HKD for the most recently audited financial year.195 Lower ad-
mission requirements are in place for the Growth Enterprise Market (GEM), 
which this Article does not discuss. 
Similarly, in China an issuer must have been continuously operating for 
at least three years since its establishment, unless otherwise approved by the 
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State Council.196 With other requirements, the Chinese market is more ac-
commodating to smaller companies than Hong Kong’s Main Board. The capi-
tal, profit and revenue requirements are: (1) 30 million RMB immediately 
prior to the IPO; (2) positive earnings each year and over 30 million RMB in 
aggregate in the three-year track record; and (3) over 300 million RMB in 
aggregate in the three-year track record respectively.197 In addition, the com-
pany should have good standing and operation compliance. To be considered 
as in good standing, the ownership of shares and key assets in the company 
must be clean and clear, without any major disputes over them.198 To be con-
sidered as in operation compliance, the company must not have committed 
any material violations of laws.199 The CSRC is particularly concerned that 
the issuer must be independent from its controlling shareholders or de facto 
controlling parties. For instance, the management and organizational structure 
of the issuer must be independent.200 By contrast, the HKEx does not have 
such an independence requirement. As a side note, China did not have a jun-
ior exchange like the GEM in Hong Kong until a new growth market was 
established in 2009.201 
An adequate market and public interest in the business of the company 
can also be, to a certain extent, reflected by the public shareholding of a com-
pany. In Hong Kong, this requirement normally means at least 25 percent of 
the company’s total issued capital must be held by the public at all times.202 
This is also an ongoing requirement and shortfalls in the public float will 
have consequences for the company.203 In the case of larger companies, the 
                                                                                                                           
 196 Shǒucì gōngkāi fāxíng gǔpiào bìng shàngshì guǎnlǐ bànfǎ (首次公开发行股票并上市管理
办法) [Administrative Measures for the Initial Public Offering and Listing of Stocks] (issued by 
China Securities Regulatory Comm., May 17, 2006), art. 9 (China). 
 197 Id. art. 33. 
 198 Id. arts. 10, 13. 
 199 See id. art. 11, (stating that the production and business operation of an issuer must comply 
with the relevant provisions of the laws, administrative regulations and its article of association, and 
shall comply to the State’s industrial policy); see also Zhōnghuá rénmín gònghéguó zhèngquàn fǎ (中
华人民共和国证券法) [Securities Law of the People’s Republic of China] (promulgated by the 
Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Dec. 29, 1998, effective Aug. 8, 2004) art. 50 (China) (stating 
that the financial accounting documents of the issuer in the past three years must not contain any 
fraudulent entries). 
 200 Administrative Measures for the Initial Public Offering and Listing of Stocks, arts. 16, 18 
(stating that the issuer’s senior management personnel shall not receive salaries from the issuer’s 
controlling person or the affiliates controlled by such a controlling person and that the functions of 
business operation and management of the issuer shall not mix up with its controlling shareholder, 
de facto controller or the affiliates.). 
 201 Robin Kwong, New Chinese Bourse Set to Lure Domestic Flotations, FIN. TIMES CHINESE 
(June 30, 2009), http://www.ftchinese.com/story/001027281/en, archived at http://perma.cc/8GFL-
R36J.  
 202 See Chapter 8: Qualifications for Listing, supra note 184, at 8.08(1)(a); Chapter 13: Con-
tinuing Obligations, supra note 124, at 13.32–13.35. 
 203 Chapter 13: Continuing Obligations, supra note 124, at 13.32. 
2015] Hong Kong: One Country Two Systems 217 
HKEx has the discretion to adjust the minimum percentage requirement to as 
low as 15 percent.204 In China, the issuer must offer at least 25 percent of its 
total share capital to the public, although an issuer with a total share capital of 
more than 400 million RMB can only make a 10 percent public offering.205 
Additionally, an IPO in China has socialist characteristics, for example, the 
requirement that 10 percent shares of a state-owned company must be trans-
ferred to the National Council for Social Security Fund when the company 
goes public.206 This makes the State Fund the largest institutional investor in 
China. 
Another distinct feature that separates China’s stock market from other 
financial markets is the “maximum public float,” which guarantees the pres-
ence of at least one controlling shareholder.207 This creates the potential for 
majority-minority conflicts. The creation of State Shares and Legal Person 
Shares, which both carry significant constraints on tradability, was a special 
mechanism introduced by the government to prevent the loss of state control, 
especially when former SOEs went public.208 Before 2005, when the non-
tradable share reform was introduced, almost two-thirds of most companies’ 
shares had been persistently and tightly locked in the hands of the state and 
other state entities.209 By the end of 2008, the percentage dropped to around 
48 percent.210 Although many Hong Kong companies also have blockholders, 
which are generally wealthy families, the market is still capable of facilitating 
the emergence of world-renowned companies with dispersed ownership, such 
as HSBC.211 
As demonstrated by the aforementioned, the criteria for entering the 
Chinese market are evidently lower than those for Hong Kong. Unlike Hong 
Kong, which has a two-tier market, the Chinese market needed to strike a 
balance between either including a wider spectrum of companies or allowing 
only a selection of elite companies. Although the Chinese market is still dom-
inated by state-owned companies, the establishment of a new board illustrated 
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the state’s efforts to reinstate the fund-raising function of the stock market for 
smaller private companies. At the same time, there will be more company 
choices for investors, depending on their own risk preference. 
2. Ongoing Requirements 
Other than some initial obligations to ensure the quality of issuers, ongo-
ing requirements are essential to keep the listed companies and their manag-
ers in check. The HKEx grants listings subject to those conditions it deems 
necessary for the protection of the investor or the maintenance of an orderly 
market.212 It can suspend dealings in any securities or cancel the listing of any 
securities as it sees fit.213 For example, an unexplained or unusual change in 
the price or volume of trading typically results in suspension. Additionally, 
when the company is in material breach of its obligations under the Listing 
Rules, the HKEx will consider suspending dealings in its shares.214 Dealing 
can also be suspended at the request of the company, which often occurs 
when the company is about to make a major announcement.215 Ultimately, 
cancellation can be imposed on the company by the HKEx pursuant to the 
Listing Rules where a company is no longer suitable to remain listed.216 This 
can occur when the company has persistently breached the Listing Rules re-
quirements. 
One of the distinguishing features of the Chinese system is the imple-
mentation of a special treatment (ST) mechanism.217 The exchanges assign 
special treatment to certain shares by putting “ST” before the company name 
when the exchanges observe financial or other abnormalities that could lead 
the company to risk.218 This designation first serves as a warning to investors 
and to the company of the risk of listing termination.219 Both exchanges im-
plement daily price range limits on share trading, namely 10 percent for nor-
mal shares and 5 percent for ST shares. 220 The limits are to prevent big 
swings in share prices to keep the market stable and protect the interests of 
retail investors. Although vigorous price fluctuations can lead to a temporary 
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suspension of trading, some circumstances can cause the suspension or per-
manent cancellation of listing. 221 Termination circumstances include: con-
sistent losses for the past three consecutive years; material financial report 
misstatements; risks of bankruptcy; failure to meet the listing requirements; 
and, involvement in illegal conduct.222 Despite the number of circumstances 
that could lead to termination, the introduction of “ST” as a buffer has greatly 
reduced the risk of delisting. 
In addition to surveillance and monitoring by the stock exchanges, the 
listed companies must follow a number of corporate governance require-
ments. The corporate governance framework in Hong Kong is derived pri-
marily from four sources: common law and equity; statutory legislation;223 
constitutional documents of the company; and soft laws. These four catego-
ries are not mutually exclusive of one another. For example, statutory re-
quirements in many respects bear a strong relationship to the directors’ fidu-
ciary duties and their common law duty of care, skills, and diligence. Similar-
ly, the Listing Rules are not legally binding, but require the statutory backing 
by virtue of the SMLR.224 Although the CO and the company constitutional 
documents provide the basic skeletal structure of a company, such as that a 
public company must have at least two directors, the Listing Rules have been 
the major driver of a wider program for improving the standards of corporate 
governance in Hong Kong. The most significant development was the adop-
tion of the Code on Corporate Governance into the Listing Rules. The Code 
largely follows the United Kingdom’s Combined Code and its “comply or 
explain” principle.225 
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According to a corporate governance report in 2005 by CLSA, a French 
investment group, and the Asian Corporate Governance Association, Hong 
Kong and Singapore remained on top in terms of the quality of corporate 
governance among Asian countries, whereas China ranked at the bottom, 
alongside the Philippines and Indonesia.226 China ranked particularly low on 
its implementation of rules and regulations as well as accounting and auditing 
standards.227 Enforcement remains the greatest concern in China. 
In China, regulatory requirements regarding corporate governance are 
reflected in the Code of Corporate Governance for Listed Companies issued 
in January 2002, which was developed in accordance with the OECD Princi-
ples of Corporate Governance.228 The principal difference between the Chi-
nese framework and the Hong Kong framework is that China has not adopted 
a “comply or explain” principle. A listed company is required to take the con-
tents specified in the Code into account when formulating or revising its arti-
cles of association and detailed management rules.229 The Code is the objec-
tive standard of measurement for the CSRC and the stock exchanges to judge 
whether a listed company has a favorable governance structure. It outlines the 
fundamental principles of the standards of conduct that should be followed by 
the management and requires listed companies to protect the interests of mi-
nority shareholders.230 The CSRC has issued certain rules to implement the 
provisions in the Code. For instance, the Rules for General Meeting of Share-
holders of Listed Companies and the revised Guidance of Articles of Associa-
tion of Listed Companies were issued in 2006.231 Pursuant to the Code and 
the Guidance Opinions on the Establishment of an Independent Director Sys-
tem in Listed Companies, independent directors must account for at least one-
third of the membership of a company’s board of directors and should include 
at least one professional accountant.232 Compensation, audit, and nomination 
committees are required to be chaired by an independent director and at least 
50 percent of the committees must be constituted by independent directors.233 
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Furthermore, a supervisory board must be established according to the Com-
pany Law.234 This is regarded as a mechanism to safeguard the lawful rights 
and interests of the company and its shareholders.235 
It is worth noting that the improvement of Chinese listed companies in 
corporate governance is mainly compelled by pressure from monitoring au-
thorities. According to a 2006 survey of the top 100 listed Chinese companies 
by the Chinese Academy of Social Science, improvement in corporate gov-
ernance was mainly driven by the higher standards of mandatory regulations 
such as information disclosure and transparency, whereas in self-disciplined 
areas such as the responsibilities of the board of directors and roles of stake-
holders, the governance standards remained low.236 
V. RECENT POLITICAL INSTABILITY IN HONG KONG 
The political explanation for the growth of western securities markets 
has been that if a society’s institutions do not promote shareholder value, then 
ownership separation, which can influence the depth of a market, ought to be 
narrower than elsewhere.237 Political stability is obviously a concern to all 
investors. Recently, the tension between pro-Beijing and pro-democracy 
groups over how the promise of universal suffrage would be delivered to the 
special administrative region has unsettled Hong Kong.238 John Tsang, Hong 
Kong’s financial secretary, remarked in August 2014 that the uncertain politi-
cal situation might lead to “a perfect financial storm.”239 Occupy Central is a 
plan initiated by the pro-democracy group to mobilize more than 10,000 peo-
ple to block streets in Central, the financial district of Hong Kong, if the gov-
ernment fails to deliver a satisfactory political reform proposal for the elec-
tion of the Chief Executive in 2017.240 John Tsang’s remark mirrors an April 
2014 study from UBS, an investment bank, which claimed that a prolonged 
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political incident in Hong Kong could cause stock market volatility and 
warned that it might take a long time for the city to regain the confidence of 
foreign investors and travelers.241 
Despite Articles 45 and 68 of the Basic Law expressly stating that the ul-
timate aim is the selection of the Chief Executive and election of all the 
members of the Legislative Council by universal suffrage upon nomination, 
discussions on the models, roadmap, and timetable for implementing univer-
sal suffrage in Hong Kong have been attracting a great deal of discussion.242 
On the one hand, the pro-democracy camp, represented by Occupy Central 
with Love and Peace (OCLP), believes the government should adopt an open-
minded attitude towards civil nomination. 243  On the other hand, the pro-
Beijing camp, represented by Silent Majority for Hong Kong (SMHK), op-
poses OCLP and fights for “democracy without chaos.”244 To eliminate con-
fusion surrounding the constitutional development in Hong Kong, both the 
Hong Kong SAR government and the Central Government of China have 
taken action. In December 2013, the Hong Kong authorities issued the Con-
sultation Document on the Methods for Selecting the Chief Executive in 2017 
and for Forming the Legislative Council in 2016 to formally commence a 
five-month public consultation to collect views from various sectors of the 
community on major issues and related questions on the two electoral meth-
ods.245 Subsequently, in June 2014, the State Council in China issued a white 
paper on the practice of the “one country, two systems” policy in Hong 
Kong.246 
The Hong Kong Bar Association was particularly anxious about two 
points in the State Council white paper. First, the Association believes that 
respect for the rule of law means more than “doing things according to 
law.”247 Proper self-restraint in the exercise of power and judicial independ-
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ence are also important.248 Furthermore, the Association criticizes the State 
Council for categorizing judges and judicial officers as part of “Hong Kong’s 
administrators,” claiming such a stance sends the wrong message to the peo-
ple that “Courts here are part of the machinery of the Government and sing in 
unison with it.”249 Similarly, the Law Society of Hong Kong responded to the 
State Council white paper by reiterating “unambiguously that the rule of law 
and judicial independence are essential for maintaining the principle of ‘One 
Country, Two Systems,’ as well as the stability and prosperity of Hong 
Kong.”250 
Despite the currently divided society, several prominent authorities are 
optimistic about the principles of “one country, two systems” and a high de-
gree of autonomy for Hong Kong. Andrew Li Kwok-nang, a former chief 
justice of the Court of Final Appeal, said he “remain[s] confident that, with 
constant vigilance, the rule of law with an independent judiciary will continue 
to thrive in the coming years.”251 The former chief justice, however, recog-
nized the inherent tensions and grey areas in the “one country, two systems” 
principles. Additionally, William Hague, former Foreign Secretary of the 
United Kingdom, also commented, “Hong Kong’s unique constitutional 
framework has worked well . . . [and it is] vital for the future prosperity and 
security of Hong Kong.”252 
CONCLUSION 
Hong Kong represents an international finance center built on the foun-
dation of Anglo-American law and finance. A strong corporate and financial 
law regime is the bedrock of success for Hong Kong. China might have 
adopted some even more stringent standards and regulations than Hong 
Kong, for example, the corporate governance arrangements are not based on a 
“comply or explain” principle and the special treatment system that is in place 
to alert investors to some potentially risky companies.253 One distinguishing 
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difference between the Chinese and Hong Kong systems is, however, that the 
CSRC is responsible for admitting securities to the listing and has a wide dis-
cretion in making this decision, whereas the SFC is not directly involved in 
listing because it has delegated this duty to the HKEx.254 Although the quota 
system has been abolished and the new Securities Law has given the Chinese 
stock exchanges more authority in the listing process, the companies to be 
publicly listed are still, to a large extent, selected by the state through control 
by the CSRC.  
The Chinese government’s strict administrative control over the market 
has led to the undesirable effect of producing losers instead of winners. With 
scarce listing quotas in the past, many companies have adopted extreme 
measures such as false accounting and bribery to obtain the opportunity to 
list. Hong Kong’s strength over the Chinese market has been evidenced by its 
ability to attract a large number of Chinese listings and, according to the 
CSRC, Chinese companies have been able to learn the management methods, 
accounting systems, laws, and regulations in a well-established market in the 
process.255  
Despite the recent constitutional reform debate, the principles of “one 
country, two systems” and the high degree of autonomy for Hong Kong, as 
enshrined in the Joint Declaration and Basic Law of Hong Kong, continues to 
receive respect from across the political spectrum. Nonetheless, the need for 
constructive dialogues and a consensus regarding how the constitutional 
package will ultimately look persists. A priority should be the preservation of 
the “one country, two systems” principles, as they are “vital for the future 
prosperity and security of Hong Kong.”256 
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